That same day he used the "hot line" to Moscow, and assured the Soviets he had no intent in opening a broader war in Vietnam. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident.
Unfortunately, much of the media reporting combined or confused the events of August 2 and 4 into a single incident. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. The original account from the Pentagon Papers has been revised in light of a internal NSA historical study,  which stated on page Carl Otis Schuster, U.
With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. Splits on the narratives stretch beyond the mainstream media, and into alternative media circles as well.
Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after hours EDT. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. Inafter working behind the scenes helping to organize, arm and equip militant Jihadis fighters and rebel operatives in Libya, the Obama Administration, led by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, desperately needed an excuse to ground the Libyan Air Force in order that NATO-backed Jihadi fighters on the ground could successfully overthrow the government of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.
The original radar contacts dropped off the scope atbut the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently.
Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of yards per minute.
Which gets me to one of my pet peeves about modern America: However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga CVA crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. A pattern took hold: They floated this junk off the coast of Central Vietnam.
Still, the damage was already done. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20, yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. Most people believe that the US lost the war. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success.
You will likely keep your job and may well get promoted. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. Operations Security OPSEC concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid.
Prior to the U. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility.
Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. For this purpose, it was authorized to approach the coast as close as 13 kilometers 8 mi and the offshore islands as close as four; the latter had already been subjected to shelling from the sea.
Carl Schuster is a retired U. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy.
Perhaps, the Guardian proposed, the Communists believed our destroyer was connected to the earlier raids against its territory. Herrick now proposed a "complete evaluation before any further action taken.
So who is driving this narrative. Ogier then opened fire at hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here.
Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. 35 comments for “ US Media as Conduits of Propaganda ” or participated in a government or privately contracted Psy Ops media propaganda program.
(Gulf of Tonkin, IranGuatemala. Tomorrow, 7 August is the day Americans mark the anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
This was the sole legal basis upon which hundreds of thousands of soldiers were sent to. War propaganda is as old as the media itself. In the winter ofa terrible incident befell America after the USS Maine, one of its flagship Naval vessels had sunk following an unexplained explosion in Havana harbor in Cuba.
The Gulf of Tonkin Deception.
On August 4,a joint US Navy patrol ran into bad weather off the coast of. The Mainstream Media lied about the Gulf of Tonkin to start the Vietnam War, Iraqi War Crimes to start the 1st Iraq War, Iraqi WMD's to start the 2nd Iraq War, and Libyan War Crimes to overthrow Gaddafi.
The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately hours Vietnam Media reporting on the NSA report’s assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin.
In Edward Moise’s book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly. An article from Media Beat in explains that the heavy reliance on U.S.
government officials as sources of information and reluctance to question official statements on national security issues led to a lot of inaccurate media reporting, such as that on the Gulf of Tonkin incident.Gulf of tonkin media propaganda